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GREENFIELD V. PHILLES RECORDS, INC.1
(decided October 17, 2002)
I. SYNoPsIs
In writing for the majority, Judge Graffeo of the New York
Court of Appeals, modified in part and affirmed in part the order
of the appellate division and held that the "unconditional transfer
of ownership rights to a work of art includes the right to use the
work in any manner unless those rights are specifically limited by
the terms of the contract."2 The court found that defendant Phil
Spector did not breach his contract with the Ronettes when he li-
censed the Ronettes' master recordings for synchronization be-
cause he was granted the unconditional rights to such masters
under their 1963 contract.3 Subsequent to rendering its decision,
the court remitted to the supreme court for further proceedings in
accordance with its opinion.
4
II. BACKGROUND
In 1963, plaintiffs the Ronettes, a singing group, signed a five-
year personal service music recording contract ("Agreement") with
defendant Phil Spector's production company ("Spector"). 5 Each
member of the Ronettes, in their individual capacity, agreed to per-
form exclusively for Spector, and in exchange Spector acquired full
ownership rights to the Ronettes' master recordings ("masters"). 6
The Agreement set forth a royalty schedule to compensate the
Ronettes for their services and Spector advanced the Ronettes ap-
proximately $15,000 in cash. 7 Other than this initial advance, the
Ronettes received no royalty payments from Spector.8
1. 98 N.Y.2d 562 (2002).
2. Id. at 572.
3. Id. at 570.
4. Id. at 574.
5. Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 2000 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 336, at *2 (Sup. Ct.
2000).
6. Id.
7. Greenfield, 98 N.Y.2d at 567.
8. Greenfield, 2000 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 336, at *2.
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Between 1963 and 1967, the Ronettes recorded approximately
28 songs for defendant Spector, including a No. 1 hit entitled "Be
My Baby."9 The Ronettes disbanded in 1967 and, thereafter, plain-
tiff Ronnie Greenfield of the Ronettes married Phil Spector.10
Eventually, Spector's company went out of business and his rela-
tionship with Greenfield ended in divorce. 1' As part of the divorce
settlement, Spector and Greenfield executed mutual general re-
leases under California law, purporting to resolve all past and fu-
ture claims and obligations that existed between them.' 2
Yet beginning in 1981, due to the resurgence of public interest
in 1960s music, Spector began to license the Ronettes masters for
use in synchronism with movies, television shows and commercials
("synchronization"). 13 Moreover, Spector licensed the masters to
third parties for production and distribution in the United States.
14
Although Spector's licensing endeavors produced substantial in-
come, the Ronettes received no royalty income.
15
Consequently, the Ronettes brought suit in the Supreme Court
of New York, New York County, for breach of contract and unjust
enrichment in 1987, alleging that the Agreement did not grant
Spector the right to license the masters for synchronization and do-
mestic redistribution. 16 Spector filed a motion to dismiss pursuant
to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(a) (5), (7) and (8). 17 The supreme court de-
nied Spector's motion and Spector appealed interlocutory.18 On
April 17, 1990, the appellate division, First Department, unani-
mously affirmed the supreme court's denial. 19
Subsequently, Spector filed a motion to strike the Ronettes' de-
mand for a jury trial and a motion in limine to exclude evidence of
custom and practice in the recording industry, i.e., evidence that
the standard royalty rate for income derived from synchronization
9. Greenfield, 2000 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 336, at *3.
10. Greenfield, 98 N.Y.2d at 567-68.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Greenfield, 2000 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 336, at *3-4.
14. Greenfield, 98 N.Y.2d at 567.
15. See id.
16. Id.
17. See Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 553 N.Y.S.2d 117, 772 (App. Div. 1990).
18. See id.
19. Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 674 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 1997).
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was 50%.2o The supreme court denied both motions and Spector
again appealed interlocutory.21 The appellate division reversed the
supreme court and granted Spector's motion to strike the Ronettes'
demand for a jury trial, yet affirmed the supreme court's denial of
Spector's motion in limine.
22
After a bench trial, the supreme court ruled in favor of the
Ronettes and awarded approximately $3 million in damages and
interest.23 The court found that the Agreement was ambiguous as
to synchronization and redistribution, and thus did not confer all
rights to Spector free from any obligation to the Ronettes.
24
Spector appealed to the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Di-
vision, First Department. 25 The appellate division affirmed the de-
cision of the supreme court, finding that the supreme court's
resolution of the relevant ambiguity was premised on a fair inter-
pretation of the evidence. 26 The New York Court of Appeals
granted Spector leave to appeal.
27
III. DIscussION
The court of appeals' analysis consisted of: (1) an inquiry into
the language of the Agreement and a determination of New York's
view on the introduction of extrinsic evidence in contract cases;
28
(2) a comparison of case precedent discussing similar contract dis-
putes;29 and (3) a justification for remittance of the case.30 The
court held that, under New York's guiding principles of contract
interpretation, the Agreement's silence on synchronization and do-
mestic licensing created no ambiguity justifying the introduction of
extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties.31
20. Greenfield, 674 N.Y.S.2d 1.
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. Greenfield, 98 N.Y.2d at 568.
24. Greenfield, 2000 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 336, at *6.
25. Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 732 N.Y.S.2d 856 (App. Div. 2001).
26. Id. at 857.
27. Greenfield, 98 N.Y.2d at 568.
28. See supra Part III.A and accompanying notes.
29. See supra Part III.B and accompanying notes.
30. See supra Part III.C and accompanying notes.
31. Greenfield, 98 N.Y.2d at 570.
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A. Contract Interpretation
The court of appeals began its analysis with an inquiry into the
standard recording contracts used by producers in the 1960s, spe-
cifically looking at the Agreement language regarding ownership
rights. 32 The ownership rights clause of the Agreement provides
that:
All recordings made hereunder and all records and
reproductions made therefrom together with the per-
formances embodied therein, shall be entirely [Spector's]
property, free from any claims whatsoever by [the Ronet-
tes] or any person deriving any rights of interest from
[the Ronettes.] Without limitation of the foregoing,
[Spector] shall have the right to make phonograph
records, tape recordings or other reproductions of the
performances embodied in such recordings by any
method now or hereafter known... 3
The Ronettes contended that the language in the agreement did
not bestow upon Spector the right to exploit the masters in new
markets or mediums because the Agreement was silent on such is-
sues.34 Yet the Ronettes conceded that the Agreement unambigu-
ously gave Spector the unconditional ownership rights to the
masters. 35 As such, Spector argued that, because the Agreement
granted him full ownership rights to the masters, the only restric-
tions upon Spector's rights were those expressly enumerated by the
Ronettes in the Agreement. 36 Accordingly, Spector argued that the
absence of specific references to synchronization and domestic li-
censing was irrelevant.
3 7
To evaluate the foregoing contentions, the court of appeals
turned to the long-settled common-law contract rules that govern
interpretation of agreements. 38 Indeed, it is a fundamental princi-
32. Greenfield, 98 N.Y.2d at 568-69.
33. Id.




38. Greenfield, 98 N.Y.2d at 569. The court also noted that, although the Copyright
Act was amended in 1971 to extend protection to sound recordings, the contract at
issue predated such amendment. Id. n.4.
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ple of contract interpretation that agreements be construed in ac-
cordance with the parties' intent.3 9 The plain meaning of the
contract language is the best evidence of the parties' intent if the
agreement is "complete, clear and unambiguous on its face. Thus,
extrinsic evidence may be considered only if the agreement is
ambiguous."
40
Further, an agreement is ambiguous if its language does not
have a "definite and precise meaning, unattended by danger of mis-
conception in the purport of the agreement itself, and concerning
which there is no reasonable basis for a difference of opinion.
'41
The court cited examples where this court asserted that if there is
only one reasonably susceptible meaning on its face, then a court is
not free to alter the agreement to reflect its personal notions of
fairness and equity.
42
In applying these principles to interpret the Agreement be-
tween the Ronettes and Spector, the court concluded that there
were no ambiguities in the terms of the Agreement and thus
Spector was entitled to exercise complete ownership rights to the
masters. 43 Yet Spector, of course, was still subject to pay the Ronet-
tes any applicable royalties for such exercise. 44 Essentially, the
Agreement's silence on synchronization and domestic licensing did
not create an ambiguity allowing the introduction of extrinsic evi-
dence to determine the parties' intent.
45
B. Supporting Authority
The court of appeals next looked to New York precedent on
the issue of retention of rights to artistic property once the work is
unconditionally transferred.46 The first case the court cited was
Pushman v. New York Graphic Soc y, 47 which involved the uncondi-
39. Greenfield, 98 N.Y.2d at 569 (citing Slatt v. Slatt, 64 N.Y.2d 966, 967 (1985)).
40. See id. (citing R/S Associates v. New York Job Dev. Auth., 98 N.Y.2d 29, 32
(2002)).
41. Id. (citing Breed v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 46 N.Y.2d 351, 355 (1979)).
42. See id. at 569-70 (citations omitted).
43. Id. at 570.
44. Id.
45. Greenfield, 98 N.Y.2d at 570.
46. See id. at 570-74.
47. 287 N.Y. 302 (1942).
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tional transfer of a painting.48 In Pushman, this court held that the
common-law did not permit an artist who unconditionally sold a
painting to enjoin the owner from making reproductions of the
work. 49 The Pushman court avowed that "an artist must, if he wishes
to retain or protect the reproduction right, make some reservation
of that right when he sells the painting."50
The court also looked to the analogous case of Burnett v.
Warner Bros. Pictures.51 In Burnett, the plaintiffs unconditionally
transferred their rights in a play to defendant, who subsequently
adapted the play into a movie and television spinoff series.52 Again,
this court noted that if the plaintiff intended to retain certain
rights, then specific clauses to that effect should have been in-
cluded in the agreement.
53
Likewise, the court noted that the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit reached the same conclusion in Boosey
& Hawkes Music Pubs. Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co.54 In Boosey, the Agree-
ment granted Walt Disney the right to record the musical composi-
tion "The Right of Spring" in "any manner, medium or form" for
use in the motion picture Fantasia.55 Walt Disney, however, repro-
duced the song in video-cassette and laser disc for foreign distribu-
tion.56 The plaintiff brought suit alleging that the agreement did
not grant Walt Disney the right to distribute the song in new tech-
nological mediums. 57 The Second Circuit reiterated its established
precedent that a licensee may properly pursue any uses that may
reasonably be said to fall within the "medium" defined in the agree-
ment.58 Specifically, the Second Circuit concluded that the broad
language of the agreement permitted Walt Disney to use the song
48. Pushman, 287 N.Y. 302.
49. Id. at 308.
50. Id.
51. 493 N.Y.S.2d 326 (App. Div. 1985), affd, 67 N.Y.2d 912 (1986).
52. Id. at 327.
53. Id. at 328.
54. 145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998).
55. Id. at 486.
56. Id. at 485.
57. ld.




in any medium, in the absence of any contractual language to the
contrary.
59
The court summarized the prevalent rules of contract con-
struction and interpretation, stating that the unconditional transfer
of ownership rights to a work of art includes the right to use the
work in any manner, unless those rights are specifically limited by
the terms of the contract.60 Essentially, the grantor will retain
unenumerated rights only where the agreement grants less than
full ownership or specifies only certain rights to use the property. 61
Accordingly, the court applied this principle to the present
case. 62 The Ronettes conceded that Spector owned the masters.
63
The Agreement expressly grants Spector the right to make repro-
ductions "by any method now or thereafter known.1 64 As such,
Spector has the right to reproduce the masters by any current or
future technological methods, including synchronization.
65
The court went on to reject the Ronettes' further conten-
tions.66 First, the court rejected the Ronettes' contention that the
royalty schedule restricts Spector's ownership rights. 67 In fact, the
royalty schedule merely provides compensation to the Ronettes,
rather than inhibiting Spector's ability to use the masters.68
Second, the court distinguished the case-law that the Ronettes
cited as supporting authority.69 In Thomas v. Gusto Records, Inc.,70
involving a contract's compensation clause, the Sixth Circuit de-
cided whether the plaintiff was entitled to royalties from the issu-
ance of domestic licenses.71 The court of appeals distinguished this
case because it did not concern the scope of the owners' rights to
use the property, as the Ronnette/Spector dispute did.72 Moreo-
59. Boosey, 145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998) (and the cases cited therein).
60. Greenfield, 98 N.Y.2d at 572.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 572-73.
63. Id. at 572.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Greenfield, 98 N.Y.2d at 572-73.
67. Id. at 572.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 573.
70. 939 F.2d 395 (6th Cir. 1991).
71. Id.
72. Greenfield, 98 N.Y.2d at 573.
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ver, Thomas conflicts with New York precedent because the Sixth
Circuit looked beyond the four corners of the agreement, stating
that the silence as to certain categories of royalties equated to con-
tractual ambiguity.73 Thus, the court of appeals distinguished
Thomas.
7 4
As a result, the court refused to follow the holding of Caldwell
v. ABKCO Music & Records, Inc. 75 because it cited the Thomas court
for the proposition that any rights not specifically granted by an
artist in an agreement are reserved to the artist.76 Furthermore,
Caldwell also held that the owner of such property, absent unambig-
uous language, is not free to do whatever he or she wishes with it.7 7
Similarly, the court declined to follow any case that involved the
transfer of only partial ownership rights.
78
Accordingly, the court held that the Agreement, when read as
a whole to determine the parties' intent, is susceptible to only one
reasonable interpretation - that Spector is authorized to license the
masters for use in synchronization and other domestic releases by
third parties.
79
C. Remittance To The Supreme Court
The court's last action was to remit the case to the Supreme
Court to recalculate plaintiffs' damages for royalties due on all such
sales.80 Although the court found in Spector's favor, Spector ac-
knowledged that the royalty schedule for domestic sales encom-
passed the sale of records, compact discs and other audio
reproductions by entities holding domestic third-party licenses
from Spector.8 1 Therefore, while Spector did not have to pay the
Ronettes royalties for all the synchronization licenses, he did have
73. Greenfield, 98 N.Y.2d at 573 (citing Reiss v. Fin. Performance Corp., 97 N.Y.2d
195, 199 (2001)).
74. See id.
75. 703 N.Y.S.2d 97 (App. Div. 2000).
76. Greenfield, 98 N.Y.2d at 573.
77. Id. (citing Caldwell v. ABKCO Music & Records, 703 N.Y.S.2d 97 (App. Div.
2000)).
78. See id. at 573 (refusing to follow Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broad. Sys.,
216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954)).
79. Id. at 572.




to pay the Ronettes royalties for the domestic third-party licenses.8 2
As such, the court remitted the case to determine damages pursu-
ant to the applicable schedule in the Agreement, rather than based
on the industry standard of 50%.
83
In so doing, the court of appeals rejected Spector's argument
that the general release under California law executed by Green-
field and Spector in their divorce proceeding barred Greenfield
from sharing in any royalties.8 4 The court looked to California's
principles of contract interpretation because the release was exe-
cuted under California law. 85 Ironically, and contrary to New York,
California looks at all extrinsic evidence as a preliminary matter,
essentially looking beyond the "four corners."8 6 The court deter-
mined that the extrinsic evidence admitted in the lower court's pro-
ceeding supported Greenfield's contention and evinced that her
right to royalties under the Agreement was not an intended subject
of the release.8 7 Therefore, the court affirmed the appellate divi-
sion's holding that Greenfield was entitled to her share of the royal-
ties from the domestic third-party licensing.
88
IV. CONCLUSION
In Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., the New York Court of Ap-
peals held that the unconditional transfer of ownership rights to a
work of art includes the right to use the work in any manner, unless
those rights are specifically limited by the terms of the contract.
89
The court held that the Agreement's silence on synchronization
and domestic licensing did not prevent Spector from engaging in
such uses because the Ronettes granted Spector complete owner-
ship rights of their masters. 90
Seth A. Dymond
82. Greenfield, 98 N.Y.2d at 573.
83. Greenfield, 98 N.Y.2d at 573-74.
84. Id. at 574.
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442
P.2d 641, 644 (Cal. 1968)).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Greenfield, 98 N.Y.2d at 572.
90. Id. at 570.
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